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Abstract 
Throughout the 1990s the state of Yugoslavia dissolved, ravaged by horrendous 
conflict. Since, several retributive and restorative mechanisms to cope with past 
atrocities have been attempted. In these processes social activists and civil society 
organizations have increasingly gained ground. Employing concepts of sociology of 
spaces, which focuses on the creation of spaces through action and the 
interdependence of action on spatial structures, I argue that activists move between 
different spaces constituted by narratives of justice and truth. Different NGOs across 
the region run trial monitoring and/or witness support programs—examples of activist 
involvement in legal spatiality. Recent fact-finding and documenting projects, such as 
the regional RECOM initiative, illustrate the creation and expansion of so-called truth 
spaces by activists. In the constitution phase of these spaces, i.e. the consultation 
meetings to establish the mandate for commissions or other investigative bodies, 
stakeholders (i.e. activists, practitioners, representatives and experts) rely on tangible 
and practicable legal instruments. A phenomenon I refer to as the legalization of truth 
spaces. Despite the symbiotic relationship between human rights activists and judicial 
practitioners this phenomenon illustrates the continuous political struggle of the 
former to institutionalize alternative transitional justice mechanisms. While their work 
focuses on personal narratives instead of grand narratives—creating a space for 
multiple narratives of victimhood—such a strategy bears several challenges vis-à-vis 
victims groups and broader reconciliatory processes. 
                                                        
1 The author wishes to thank Jo-Marie Burt, Earle Reybold, Iva Vukušić, Olga Martin-Ortega, 
Peter Mandaville, Harvey Weinstein and Nahla Valji for reading earlier drafts of this article and 
providing valuable comments to help clarify certain aspects and is indebted to Vjeran 
Pavlaković, Christopher Lamont, and other colleagues and friends for the many conversations 
that helped improve this article. 
Arnaud Kurze 
 
1 
 
Introduction 
In the 1990s the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia broke up, engulfed by 
violence across the region. Amidst flaring conflict, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created with the aim to push 
for accountability for past war crimes and human rights violations. Over the 
years, the ad hoc UN Tribunal’s work has led to a spillover effect of 
international criminal law into domestic judicial systems in the region (Teitel 
2010; Martin-Ortega and Herman 2010), and civil society actors have 
supported these retributive justice efforts participating and/or running different 
programs, including witness protection and trial monitoring.2 Recent research 
on this topic affirmed that civil society actors, as a result, expanded their 
influence and impact—reaching beyond the initial judicial support, in which 
NGOs have been invited to participate by state actors—and created a 
deliberative space to increase victims’ voices in society, so-called ‘invented 
spaces’ (Jeffrey 2011). Such scholarly insight is important, as several past 
restorative justice attempts across different countries in the region resulted in 
limited success (Jouhanneau 2010; Grodsky 2009; Jelena Pejic 2001). 
Notwithstanding, social activists and civil society organizations have 
incrementally increased their role and reach in transitional justice processes.3 
In this article, I discuss the ongoing 2008-transnational truth-seeking initiative, 
called Coalition for RECOM, to elucidate the sociopolitical struggle of coalition 
members to advocate for alternative models to cope with mass atrocity in the 
former Yugoslavia. 
 Drawing on concepts of sociology of spaces—based on the study of 
establishing spaces through action and the interdependence of action on 
spatial structures (Urry 2000)—I illustrate how activists move between 
different spaces constituted by narratives of justice and truth. The study is 
based on over two dozen semi-structured interviews with key actors, such as 
human rights activists, representatives of domestic and international judicial 
institutions, and international organizations, among others.4 While early on, 
human rights organizations in the region acted primarily within the legal 
space—they contributed to improving domestic war crimes prosecutions by 
providing support to witnesses and victims, some of who were initially 
exposed to intimidation and death threats due to the absence of anonymous 
testimonies in the court room during hearings and the lack of media 
responsibility5—subsequent projects were (and still are) an attempt to expand 
their space from domestic justice-oriented activities to regional truth-finding 
efforts.  
                                                        
2 Other authors and reports have criticized the effectiveness of this justice cascade. See for 
instance (Subotić 2009) and annual activity reports of NGOs, such as Documenta and 
Humanitarian Law Center, among others. 
3 Several authors have addressed the question of human rights activism in transitional justice 
processes and in particular highlighting the important impact of local NGOs in different regions 
(Roht-Arriaza 2005; Collins 2006; Burt 2009). 
4 Additionally, the study draws from various reports and other documentation. 
5 See “Transitional Justice in the Balkans—Judicial Transparency and Media Responsibility,” 
conference organized by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), Sarajevo, BiH, 
September 1-3, 2009. 
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 Interestingly, however, the expansion of so-called truth spaces poses 
myriad challenges. The attempt of establishing a truth-seeking body for the 
former Yugoslavia has faced different types of opposition, ranging from 
internal disapproval by certain of its members to external  (in)direct critique 
and politicization across the region. With the aim of creating a broad regional 
truth-finding initiative, the Coalition for RECOM also grapples with different 
types of victims (including families of victims, prisoners, and veterans, among 
others) who have, sometimes, conflicting needs and/or demands. Moreover, 
the dominance of legal concepts in institutionalizing truth-seeking measures 
raises questions about the influence and consequences of hard justice (such 
as retributive mechanisms) on soft justice (such as restorative tools, including 
truth commissions). In this article, I refer to this trend as the legalization of 
truth spaces. In fact, with the current legalization of truth spaces activists not 
only increase their ‘invented’ space to foster deliberative spaces of justice for 
civil society, but also attempt to embed their newly created space in the 
space originally provided by state institutions to depoliticize transitional justice 
efforts in the region. I argue, however, that their goal of legal-oriented 
depoliticization of restorative justice processes remains nonetheless highly 
political.  
 This article is organized in three sections. First, I describe the continuous 
struggle of human rights activists to create a transnational extra-legal space 
to deal with the past across the former Yugoslavia. I particularly focus on 
internal and external obstacles the movement faces. Second, I discuss issues 
of multiple narratives of victimhood, partly because of the transnational 
character of the restorative justice efforts. In order to do so, I draw on several 
different cases. Third, I examine the challenges of the legalistic influence on 
truth seeking. In particular, I analyze the ongoing political battle to 
institutionalize alternative transitional justice mechanisms. 
 
The RECOM Initiative: Struggling Efforts to Create Extra-Judicial Space  
Several authors have explored the sociopolitical role of NGOs in society using 
a sociology-of-space perspective in order to illustrate their active involvement 
in shaping policy processes (Miraftab and Wills 2005).6 Drawing on Miraftab’s 
and Wills’ notion of invited spaces—i.e. state institutions provide opportunities 
for civil society to participate actively in certain problem areas—Alex Jeffrey 
recently analyzed the creation of space (invented spaces) by Bosnian human 
rights organizations to allow for deliberate conceptions of justice that go 
beyond legal institutions and processes (Jeffrey 2011). His study defies a 
legalist approach, illustrating how activists who initially cooperated with the 
judiciaries have established alternative ways to implement transitional justice 
in post-conflict settings. While I employ these concepts to investigate regional 
transitional justice NGO activities in the former Yugoslavia in this paper, I 
concentrate on the difficulties human rights activists are confronted with 
during the creation of regional restorative justice efforts. 
 The recent attempts of institutionalizing an interstate fact-finding body—
to account for past human rights violations and war crimes in the Balkans—
emerged as a response to the rising critique of international and domestic war 
                                                        
6 For an extensive discussion on time and space, see (Urry 2000). 
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crimes prosecutions in the region. In fact, retributive justice mechanisms to 
cope with the past, such as ICTY, despite its great global impact on and 
model character for human rights and criminal law, has only partially fulfilled 
its mandate to help war-torn and post-conflict societies in the region transition 
(Subotić 2009). Some of the issues include: the geographical distance of the 
court in the Netherlands and the crime scene sites—which has often been 
criticized by victims/witnesses; the trial of selective cases only (both on the 
international as well as domestic level); and the politicization of cooperation 
processes between countries of the former Yugoslavia and the UN tribunal in 
The Hague (Teitel 2005). Victims, and society in general, felt alienated by 
international and domestic accountability efforts.  
 Increasing critique from victim associations and human rights 
organizations thus helped launch an alternative process to improve the 
relationship between law and society. The idea was that progress does not lie 
in more personnel, better strategies, and on-site presence of the judiciary 
system, but in the way that those who suffered most during the conflicts are 
integrated into projects to cope with the past. The activities of several non-
profit organizations—many of which often started working at the outbreak of 
violence in the early 1990s7 or shortly after—demonstrate the increasing 
efforts to raise victims’ voices in transitional justice processes in the Balkans. 
In fall 2005, three established non-profit organizations in the region, the 
Humanitarian Law Center (Serbia), Documenta (Croatia), and the Research 
and Documentation Center (Bosnia and Herzegovina),8 discussed the 
prospects of an independent regional commission that investigates and 
discloses the facts about war crimes and other serious human rights 
violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.9 A few years later, these 
organizations had gained enough momentum and launched the Coalition for 
RECOM with over 100 NGOs from the region in Priština, Kosovo (Coalition 
for RECOM 2009). Due to the still highly politicized landscape of war-crime-
related issues in the region, the founders of the initiative stressed the 
importance of establishing a platform offering victims an opportunity to 
express themselves and put a damper on the relativization of any crimes 
against humanity by local and national authorities or justification of “crimes 
committed against opposing sides in the conflict” (Coalition for RECOM 
2010). The initiative comes hence as a response to other transitional justice 
                                                        
7 Cf. for instance the activities of the Humanitarian Law Center in Belgrade, Serbia, that 
documents war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and promotes victims rights, based on various 
initiatives, at http://www.hlc-rdc.org/stranice/Linkovi-modula/About-us.en.html (accessed 5 
December 2009).  
8 These various organizations have as their core mission to document and disclose facts about 
the human rights violations and war crimes committed during the 1990s to educate society and 
create a voice for victims.  Various forms of implementing this mission exist. Documenta, for 
instance, among other things, engages in commemorative culture, history teaching, and 
dealing with the past initiatives, thus emphasizing the interactive dialogue with society. The 
Research and Documentation Center, concentrates its work on documenting missing persons, 
and has published a comprehensive account of all the war victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
The Bosnian book of the dead (2009), as well as an interactive Google map that shows 
location, nature of the crime and number of victims. The Humanitarian Law Center, despite its 
involvement in commemorative culture, is known for its strong legal activities, providing support 
for victims in court and vis-à-vis state institutions. 
9 The International Center for Transnational Justice (ICTJ) and other prominent NGOs in the 
region also participated in this discussion. 
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mechanisms, such as international and domestic courts, which have proven 
to be limited in their success to cope with the violent past in the region.10 
 RECOM aims at creating a space for victims to be heard in society, 
fueling sympathy and understanding, particularly from perpetrator groups. 
According to its advocates, RECOM is to provide a mechanism that takes into 
account the context of the past conflict. With over half a dozen of countries 
involved in the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, dealing with past war 
crimes issues does not stop at national borders, but goes beyond the 
sovereign territory of the current states. Additionally, RECOM coalition 
members plan on creating a comprehensive database of victims to end the 
perpetual politicization of the number of victims in the region. RECOM also 
aspires to help war crimes prosecutors with evidence material, witness 
handling and search of the missing. The initiative’s ambitious goals, however, 
are tainted by internal disagreements of different coalition members.  
 Since the official constitutional meeting of the RECOM coalition in 
Priština in 2008 the initiative has faced internal politicking and difficulties.  
The driving coalition partners of RECOM, such as Documenta and the 
Humanitarian Law Center, in particular, have grappled with mobilizing 
coalition partners from Bosnia and Herzegovina, after the head of the 
Bosnian RDC, for different reasons, refused to give his official support to the 
coalition at one of the meetings in winter 2008.11 Void of an essential 
member—BiH constitutes a symbolic member country due to its weighty 
history during the 1992-1995 conflict—HLC director, Nataša Kandić, 
managed to fill the gap created by the loss of the influential RDC by 
partnering with the Association of BiH Journalists.12 Yet, the fact that this 
organization does not essentially concentrate on war crimes reporting has 
affected its legitimacy within the coalition, according to a prominent member 
of the initiative.13 Critique has also come from participating organizations that 
have deplored the lack of transparency in RECOM’s decision-making process 
(B92 2011). Moreover, the uncertain outcome of whether the commission will 
be created and the long process in rallying financial and political support—
both of which have been fluctuating and vague—has also led to a RECOM 
fatigue with each of the main partner organizations focusing their energy and 
resources on domestic and local programs in their respective home 
countries.14 In addition to internal obstacles, the initiative’s institutionalization 
process has faced difficulties fueled by other political and international actors 
in the region. 
 Although the political and institutional context in the former Yugoslavia 
has become more favorable for the RECOM initiative in recent years, 
numerous obstacles still impede the creation of a fact-finding body. In the 
following I describe the fragile political progress across the region and outline 
some of the inherent problems. The first important political wave of change in 
                                                        
10 See reports published by human rights organizations, including Documenta, the 
Humanitarian Law Center, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, among others. 
11 See interview with Mirsad Tokača, director of the Research and Documentation Center in 
June 2011. 
12 See interview with Nataša Kandić, director of the Humanitarian Law Center, in May 2011. 
13 See interview with official member of Coalition for RECOM in Zagreb in February 2011. 
14 See supra note 13. See also programs by Documenta, http://www.documenta.hr or the 
Humanitarian Law Center http://www.hlc-rdc.org (accessed 23 November, 2010). 
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the former Yugoslavia occurred in the early 2000s. Tudjman’s death in 1999 
allowed the conservative nationalist era to end in which the narrative of the 
glorious homeland war to defend the young nation didn’t leave any room for 
discussion of war crimes and human rights violations. Serbia’s notorious 
leader Milošević was booted out of power after his 2000 electoral defeat and 
rising protest from the streets after he attempted to unilaterally remain in 
power (Ramet 2010, chap. 12 and 13). This tabula rasa with the past, 
however, was only the tip of the iceberg of a long process that is still ongoing.  
 Indeed, current political leaders in both countries, Ivo Josipović the 
president of the Republic of Croatia (who began his first term in February 
2010), and Boris Tadić the president of the Republic of Serbia (in his second 
term, which started in February 2008), have both made important strides to 
foster a climate of rapprochement in the region. They represent a new 
political generation that has not been personally involved (be it directly or 
indirectly) in war crimes or the human rights violations of the 1990s conflicts.15 
In 2007, for instance, Tadić released a statement on Croatian national TV on 
the eve of Croatia’s 16th independence anniversary, June 24, 2007, 
apologizing for crimes committed against the Croatians by members of the 
Serbian population.16 While then-president of Croatia, Stjepan Mesić 
welcomed the remarks, nationalist hardliners at home, such as Aleksandar 
Vučić, secretary general of the Serbian Radical Party, ferociously criticized 
him as a national traitor (Popovic 2007). Already in 2004, the Serbian 
president has made similar remarks while on a visit to Sarajevo, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.17 More recently, on November 4, 2010, Tadić apologized for the 
massacre that took place 19 years ago in Vukovar, a town in Northeastern 
Croatia.18 He said that “[b]y acknowledging the crime, by apologizing and 
regretting, we are opening the way for forgiveness and reconciliation”; yet not 
everyone received him with wide open arms, as several mothers of those 
killed in Vukovar turned their backs while he gave his speech (Associated 
                                                        
15 In the 1980s, Josipović was a member of the League of Communists of Croatia, playing a 
key role in the democratic transformation of this party as the author of the first statute of the 
Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP) after Croatia’s independence. He left politics in the 
mid-1990s, pursuing his academic career as a law professor at the University of Zagreb and 
only reentered the political realm in 2003, when Ivica Račan, then acting Prime Minister, invited 
him to join the government. Serbia’s president, Boris Tadić, a trained psychologist, was part of 
the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, which was key in overthrowing Milosević in 2000.  
Politically part of the Democratic Party, he has made multiple symbolic reconciliatory public 
statements that are a sign of collaboration and understanding of both countries.  
16 The rising wave of apologies in the region of the former Yugoslavia is not limited to Serbia 
and Croatia. In November 2010, Bakir Izetbegovic, Bosniak member of Bosnia-Herzegovina's 
tripartite presidency, apologized for deaths caused by his ethnic group among other ethnicities. 
This trend started in 2000 with Montenegrin President Milan Djukanovic, when he apologized 
for the 1991 shelling of the Croatian coastal city of Dubrovnik in which his country was 
involved. Since, the Serbian and Croat heads of state have apologized in 2003, and Tadić 
apologized to Bosnians in Sarajevo in 2004 for Serbian atrocities committed there. Additionally, 
Josipović has apologized at Jasenovac, a World War II concentration camp, where tens of 
thousands of people were killed during World War II. Public apologies are not the only trend, as 
there have been political and judicial conciliation as well. The Parliament of Serbia, for 
instance, voted on a resolution on the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, while Croatia is assisting 
Serbia in its bid to join the EU (Nenad Pejic 2010) 
17 See “Tadić se izvinio građanima Hrvatske,” B92, 24 June 2007.  
18 Vukovar is situated close to the Serbian border and a war site where Serbian forces took 
over 200 hospitalized Croats to a nearby pig farm in Ovčara and massacred them in November 
1991. 
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Press 2010). Both of these examples illustrate how the political landscape 
equals a minefield, as not only right-wing nationalist veterans feel betrayed, 
but also victims express their discontent with political symbolism that does not 
go far enough in their eyes. Tadić’s Croatian counterpart, Josipović, 
reciprocated these symbolic steps, and during the November 4, 2010 
ceremony in Vukuvar, he laid down a wreath in commemoration of over a 
dozen Serbs that had been killed in a nearby village (Ibid.).19 Both leaders 
have also expressed their political backing of the RECOM initiative, in fall 
2010 when RECOM members solicited them to publicly ask for their support 
(Andrić and Hadžović 2011). 
 However, in spite of the symbolic gestures and discourses by head of 
states in both of these countries (and across the region) institutional 
drawbacks remain—ranging from the lack of investigations of war crimes 
involving high-profile Croatian politicians, such as the former speaker of the 
parliament, Viktor Šeks (Amnesty International 2010), to the appointment by 
the current Serbian government of Zoran Stanković as head of the Serbian 
Ministry of Health who is a crony of indicted war criminal, Bosnian Serbian 
General Ratko Mladić (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2011a).  
 Interestingly, support from international organizations to create RECOM’s 
institutional framework also remains limited and further complicates human 
rights efforts to account for war crimes. While the Political Affairs Committee 
of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (CoE) has released a 
report expressing its support for regional reconciliatory justice mechanisms 
among states of the former Yugoslavia, such as the regional truth-seeking 
initiative RECOM (Marcenaro 2011), other organizations, including the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the European Union (EU), 
among others, avoid public statements that engage in political or financial 
support of RECOM.20 Politicking among Coalition members and the lack of 
external support, however, are not the only challenges the RECOM initiative 
has to overcome. During the creation of this truth space a debate about the 
meaning of victims has emerged, producing different opposing narratives of 
victimhood.  
 
Multiple Conflicting Narratives of Victimhood 
Recent scholarship has grappled with the question of victimhood in post-
authoritarian regimes. Drawing on interviews and news sources with the 
confessions of perpetrators in post-conflict settings in Argentina, Brazil, Chile 
and South Africa, for instance, Leigh Payne analyzes the behavior of 
perpetrators (in terms of remorse, heroism, denial, or sadism, or through lies 
or betrayal) and the reaction of victim groups (Payne 2008). In the case of the 
former Yugoslavia, denial still remains an important phenomenon in society. 
Partly, as we will see in the following, because state institutions have 
sustained certain political discourses—such as the foundational myth of the 
Croatian Homeland War 1991-1995. In this context, veterans have enjoyed 
                                                        
19 In spring 2010, when giving a talk in front of the Bosnian Parliament, Josivpović also 
apologized for crimes committed against Bosnians by the Croatian people. See “Josivpović 
apologizes for Croatia´s role in war in Bosnia,” Croatian Times, 15 April 2010. 
20 See interview with United Nations Development Program and European Union officials in 
Sarajevo in May 2011. 
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privileges guaranteed and provided by the state.21 On the contrary, state 
institutions across the region have often ignored the fate of war victims and 
their families. During the RECOM consultation process participating victims 
association have therefore stressed the need to define the meaning and 
status of a victim, illustrating RECOM initiators’ conundrum of integrating 
different narratives of the region’s looming past.  
 As a member of a local victim association from Zvornik, a town in 
northeastern Bosnia from which nearly all Muslims were expelled during the 
1992-1995 war, underlined: 
Persecution of the civilian population can’t be compared to the persecution of those who 
bore rifles and were members of a military formation. Today, these numbers are being 
made equal. It is impossible to make a balance in this war: they are trying to make it up 
with the previous war. (...) This means that a civilian is a civilian, a soldier should not be 
mentioned because after all he was a member of the army, those are separate issues. 
However, here we exclusively speak about civilians, people who were taken and killed at 
their doorsteps or a bit further depending on where one was killed (Cited in Coalition for 
RECOM 2009, 8). 
This narrative, however, stands in opposition with the RECOM members’ goal 
to establish facts about human rights violations and war crimes of all 
victims.22 And indeed, in some cases, the meaning of victim includes social 
groups that do not match the Zvornikan’s above definition but include former 
members of the armed forces. Although the Coalition for RECOM counts only 
six veterans associations versus well over one hundred victim associations, 
this situation demonstrates the inherent predicament of RECOM’s leading 
members to draw bridges among different local and regional civil society 
organizations during their consultation meetings.  
 In local and regional consultation meetings, such as in Vukovar in 
summer 2010 and in Skopje in winter 2010, for instance, members of different 
branches of the Association of Underage Volunteers of the Homeland War 
also participated in the discussion.23 These organizations have been created 
for persons, who at the time of the war were not considered adults, yet fought 
in the 1991-1995 Croatian war. As underage participants in the hostilities, 
however, the Croatian state does not provide any veteran pensions for these 
categories.24 Hence, the concerns of one of their representatives with regards 
to RECOM’s task of registering human losses stands in contrast with the 
statement given by the member of the Zvornika victims association: 
I am in favour of a register of all losses, which would include both civilians and military 
men, and that list must inevitably include foreign nationals who participated in those 
conflicts. How are we going to register them? We should include them in the same 
register, together with the members of international forces. And a separate register 
should be created for victims, primarily victims of war crimes.25  
                                                        
21 Veterans in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, have also benefitted from financial and 
political support by their respective governments. See (Popić and Panjeta 2010). 
22 The final draft of the statute was adopted on the fourth Coalition for RECOM Assembly 
Meeting on 26 March 2011 in Belgrade. The draft is available at 
http://www.zarekom.org/documents/Proposed-RECOM-Statute.en.html, accessed on 2 May 
2011. 
23 See reports of the consultation meetings at http://www.zarekom.org/Consultations.en.html, 
accessed on 11 February 2011. 
24 See informal interview with Documenta director Vesna Teršelić in Vukovar on 14 July 2010. 
25 Supra note 23. 
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RECOM’s policy strategy thus does not necessarily receive the approval from 
its main target and support groups of war victims. As a result of its holistic 
approach some victims organizations, such as the Mothers of Srebrenica, do 
not participate officially as a member of the RECOM coalition because their 
members insisted on the exclusive definition of noncombatants (Coalition for 
RECOM 2009, 8).26  Narratives by political actors and state institutions also 
complicate RECOM’s mission to establish a regional commission. 
 Nationalist discourses generated by (particularly populist) political actors 
across the region still pose an impediment to the successful creation of truth 
spaces by human rights activists. As a case in point, after the arrest of Ratko 
Mladić on 26 May 2011, the Serbian Radical Party organized a rally 
consisting of about 10,000 nationalist protestors who rallied—with a small 
amount of participants rioting—in front of the Serbian parliament in Belgrade 
to demonstrate against Mladić’s extradition to The Hague (Erlanger 2011). 
Earlier, in the spring, Croatia faced a similar fate with nationalists and 
veterans mobilizing large part of Croatian society across the region in order to 
protest against the ICTY verdict in the General Ante Gotovina case (Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2011b). The verdict was handed down two days 
before the initial start date of the RECOM signature in Croatia. Given the very 
tense political climate in the country, human rights activists postponed the 
launch of the signature campaign to a later date in order to prevent violence 
among their campaign volunteers and demonstrators.27  Drawing on the latter 
case, I will explore the question of state victimhood, as an institutional hurdle 
to the constitution of truth spaces in society—in addition to the differing 
narratives of victims mentioned above—and which further exacerbates the 
work of NGO activists in the field.  
 Political symbolism has a very strong effect on the community if it is 
grounded in lived experience (Bellamy 2003, 1-6). Not surprisingly, the 
foundational myth of former Croatian army member, Gotovina—who has risen 
to an emblematic war hero figure in Croatian society, and who has incarnated 
the ontological core of the nation’s nascent identity in a fight of good (Croatia) 
against evil (Serbia)—has sparked ferocious criticism at the intersection 
between international and national politics. Despite the Croatian 
government’s international cooperation which led to his arrest and transfer to 
the ICTY in December 2005, the normative shift in favor of international 
humanitarian law in the endlessly dragging—and politically highly explosive—
extradition issue of Gotovina was incomplete. In fact, during the entire period, 
politicians carefully open debate on Croatia’s national foundational myths 
(Pavlaković 2008). After the verdict, the Croatian government even took the 
necessary steps to initiate an appeals process and provide sufficient legal 
and financial assistance to Gotovina’s defense team in The Hague (Croatian 
Times 2011).  
 Moreover, however, comparing judicial institutional practices with the 
above discursive practices in politics highlights how identity shifts and 
collective memory are more difficult to change. As a case in point, recent war 
crimes prosecutions, such as the Medak Pocket case before the Zagreb 
County Court in 2008—a trial in which two former Croatian generals were 
                                                        
26 Supra note 13. 
27 See interview with Signature Campaign officials of the Coalition for RECOM in May 2011. 
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accused of crimes against ethnic Serbian civilians during a military operation 
in the fall of 1993 in the south-central region of Croatia—highlight the 
judiciary’s reluctance to apply practices in compliance with international 
transitional justice norms.28 Human rights organizations monitoring trials have 
criticized the prosecution’s lack of interest “in identifying and punishing other 
commanders and direct perpetrators in the Medak Pocket case, in spite of 
evidence pointing to certain persons, members of certain military formation” 
(Kandić 2009, 131). These drawbacks within national judicial institutions are 
not exceptions, but a trend in how transitional justice is struggling to move 
from the international to the national level (Lazić, Jahić, and Kruhonja 2009, 
18-24; Subotić 2009, 101-6; Pavlaković 2009, 17). It is unsurprising then, that 
human rights activists have geared up to provide alternative spaces of 
deliberation for victims in society. Paradoxically, however, with the aim to 
confront the issue of politicization of accountability efforts, their activities are 
influenced by and rely on a legalistic perspective, which in turn poses a 
number of problems. 
  
The Legalization of Truth Spaces and Challenges  
At the beginning of this article I introduced a trend I refer to as the legalization 
of truth spaces—basically describing the phenomenon how activists, 
practitioners, representatives and experts employ tangible and practicable 
legal instruments during consultation meetings in order to establish the 
mandate for the regional commission. In the following section I will discuss 
the phenomenon, because this juridification of truth-seeking bodies bears its 
roots in a broader law-society development. It describes the interactions 
between legal experts—i.e. elite, academic and professional networks—and 
their relationship to society in diverse sociopolitical contexts. Though not 
applied on the legalization of mechanisms that deal with past mass atrocities, 
Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth have studied this trend in a more general 
international and regional context. Drawing on Latin America, they have 
explored the export of globalized legal knowledge by Western elites and their 
relationship to local elites educated in the West in order to scrutinize the 
emergence of specific rule of law trends in this region (2002). The conceptual 
underpinning of their study can also be applied to the current analysis of the 
RECOM fact-seeking initiative. 
 Indeed, the institutionalization of truth-seeking bodies raises questions 
about the influence of hard justice, such as retributive mechanisms, on soft 
justice, such as restorative tools, including truth commissions. The former is 
based on measurable results, notably the number of processed cases and 
rendered verdicts, whereas the latter, at least initially, have relied on 
outcomes which seem, at first, less quantifiable. Yet, sociologist and director 
of the Truth-Seeking Program at the International Center for Transitional 
Justice, Eduardo Gonzalez—who has consulted and participated in many 
different local, national and regional initiatives around the world to set up 
commissions and bodies that deal with the past29 —has stressed the need to 
                                                        
28 In an unpublished manuscript, “Croatia: Parody of Justice, Case Đermanović,”  (2010), Mia 
Psorn highlights the problematic rule of law situation in Croatian county courts. 
29 He also consulted the RECOM members during meetings in Serbia and Kosovo in spring 
and summer 2010. 
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think differently when it comes to implementing successful strategies for truth 
commissions.30  
 The reason why judicial mechanisms are able to produce a quicker, and 
often, in terms of output (i.e. number of verdicts), more successful track 
record, is because law, i.e. the rules generally accepted by a community and 
that regulates the actions of its members and in case of a breach may be 
enforced by the imposition of penalties, has turned the notion of justice into 
something tangible and applicable despite its disputable value and impact on 
a subject, in time and in space. The notion of truth, however, cannot easily be 
quantifiable or be constrained in a body of legal texts.31 Nonetheless, RECOM 
coalition members have set out the goal of creating a large database, tracking 
cases and human losses across the region.32 This project thus adopts policy 
strategies implemented by the UN ad hoc court—which has a large electronic 
database of its cases—and local institutions, such as the Bosnian state court, 
which has one of the most state of the art databases to document its cases 
and help coordination between different judiciaries on the entity level in BiH.33 
 Despite the meticulous and ongoing attempts to fit the mandate of a 
regional commission neatly into a legal document, the statute, the strengths 
of this initiative might lie elsewhere. Various efforts—e.g. numerous 
congressional bodies of inquiry on specific massacres or death squads—
have for instance preceded the Peruvian truth commission, which was put in 
place in the early 2000s and delivered an 8000-page report at the end of 
2003. In fact, the institutionalization of RECOM—no matter how desirable by 
its proponents—is far from being a fait accompli. Many factors, ranging from 
the regional political climate to internal consensus of the coalition members 
demonstrate that this initiative still requires ample support from within and 
outside. Notwithstanding, according to a member of the RECOM draft statute 
advisory board, even if all these efforts would not result in the creation of the 
commission, many positive side effects will remain in the region. The legacy 
includes strengthening local grass roots efforts, improving a commemorative 
culture, and inciting transnational cooperation between governments and civil 
society, among others.34  
 The efforts put into setting up RECOM, however, are a proof that 
stakeholders (including activists, practitioners and lawmakers), are learning 
from past mistakes—such as merely copying a fact-finding body that is 
modeled on the concept of the South African truth commission—as every 
context, conditions and objectives are unique for each case. Hence, to cope 
with the dominant influence of legal experts in shaping an adequate body for 
dealing with mass atrocities in the Balkans, RECOM members have tried to 
expand the range of consultants and experts that the future commission will 
draw from. Similar to the Peruvian truth commission—which had political 
                                                        
30 See interview with Eduardo Gonzalez on 10 September 2010 in Belgrade, Serbia. 
31 Retributive justice mechanisms, however, have also a truth-disclosing component and 
therefore are considered by some as history-setting institutions. For a discussion on the 
history-defining capacity of the ICTY cf. (Wilson 2005). 
32 See interview with RECOM coalition members in June 2011. 
33 See interview with Sven Marius Urke, secondee of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and 
currently international advisor at the Bosnian High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council in May 
2011.  
34 See interview with Vjeran Pavlaković, historian (University of Rijeka) and member of 
RECOM for overview of human rights activism in Croatia. September 2010.  
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scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists and historians, among 
others—the Coalition for RECOM has invited scholars, practitioners and 
experts from different fields that range from history to psychology.35 While the 
ratio of non-legal experts remains still relatively low, this trend highlights the 
attempt to tackle political and institutional challenges differently. Each of the 
experts brings a unique set of assets and knowledge to the discussion table, 
which—notably for the preparation and consultation to define the mandate of 
the commission—was very crucial. While psychoanalysts will be able to 
evaluate or address questions related to victims and how they deal with 
trauma in certain forms of testimonies or public hearings, forensic 
anthropologists can help define practical parameters when it comes to 
determining the role of RECOM in mass grave discoveries, and historians 
prove useful to delineate the historical period for which the commission 
should be designed for. Although it is too early to assess the impact of one 
choice over another, these developments emphasize the increasing role of 
civil society in a dynamic and experimental transitional justice space in the 
former Yugoslavia. This experience can also serve as a very helpful example 
in the context of other regional post-conflict settings. 
 Moreover, the section of RECOM’s draft mandate that addresses the 
issue of national war crimes prosecutions calls for a brief reflection on 
critically embedding truth seeking in a legal and/or judicial space. According 
to the draft statute, institutionally, RECOM will be an official body endorsed by 
the various governments of the former states of Yugoslavia, but will function 
independently. In order to emphasize the institutionalized grassroots effort, a 
signature campaign was launched to collect over one million signatures 
across the region. The idea was to generate enough public support and 
buttress lobbying efforts with respect to introducing legislation in each of the 
RECOM member countries to establish the official institutional structure.36  It 
will only be in place for a relatively short period of time (two years with a six 
months preparation period) with its mandate expanding to the territory of the 
states where crimes have been committed in the past. In theory, the body has 
a non-judicial character, however, the consequences of certain powers 
exerted by the members was a touchy bone of contention in numerous 
consultation and workshop meetings between coalition members who 
discussed the mandate and role of the commission in view of finalizing the 
draft statute.37 This issue illustrates the problematic character of truth 
commission mandates in general. On the one hand, their objective is to 
disclose facts about human rights violations by providing victims a space to 
raise their voice—a form of soft justice to deal with the past. On the other 
hand, their goal is also to account for violence and war crimes, which, in 
many cases, require some form of retributive justice.38 In the case of the 
RECOM statute, article 49, ‘The role of the Commission in criminal 
                                                        
35 Supra note 34, and informal conversations with Vesna Teršelić in August 2010. 
36 Supra note 13. Currently, the campaign collected over 500,000 signatures and now 
continues to collect signatures online. 
37 Supra note 22. 
38 While Rwandan Gacaca courts have dealt with mass atrocities on a local scale (including 
shaming and other forms of sanctions for less grave crimes), the Peruvian truth commission 
cooperated with the domestic judiciary to prosecute perpetrators. 
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prosecution,’ has repeatedly been discussed in multiple consultation 
sessions.39 
 Article 49 of the RECOM draft statute comprises three articles relative to 
the role of RECOM with respect to alleged perpetrators that participate in, 
e.g. public hearings and reveal “information leading to the discovery of a 
mass grave location or information significant for discovering other 
perpetrators.” While paragraph one stipulates a suggestive power to RECOM 
vis-à-vis a war crimes court to recommend mitigating circumstances if any 
information is obtained from an alleged perpetrator that could lead to either 
the discovery of missing persons in mass graves or other perpetrators, 
paragraphs two and three propose pardons if the collected information from 
an alleged (paragraph two) or sentenced (paragraph three) perpetrator lead 
to further discoveries that help the overall fact-finding mission about past 
atrocities. Prima facie, this discussion seems purely legal, concerning the 
definition of the roles between the judiciary and RECOM. This issue, 
however, when examined more closely, reveals a set of problems that range 
from defining the scope of amnesties–which in the case of RECOM have a 
conditional character—to the current judicial system’s effectiveness in the 
region, thus turning the scope of legal issues into political challenges.40 
 
Conclusion 
This article has examined the recent regional restorative justice mechanisms 
in the former Yugoslavia, the so called Coalition for RECOM, which is 
currently taking shape and finished its consultations process and meetings to 
define its mandate and the institutional character of its body. After the violent 
disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the region has witnessed several 
retributive and restorative mechanisms to cope with the past, including war 
crimes tribunals—on the international and (to a lesser, but still noticeable 
extent) national level—and truth-seeking and fact-finding initiatives. During 
these processes human rights activists have occupied an important 
intermediary function, communicating and interacting between spaces 
constituted of varying justice and truth narratives. The aim of this article was 
to analyze these different, intersecting spaces and the role of civil society 
within these spaces to help understand recent practices to establish a 
transnational truth-seeking mechanism. In the beginning, the study addressed 
the ongoing internal and external struggle of human rights activists to 
establish an extra-legal space to deal with the past across the former 
Yugoslavia. In this context, I also analyzed the conflicting impact of different 
victim groups’ narratives that accompanied the institutionalization process. 
Finally, I examined the consequences of legal concepts that influence the 
institutionalization of truth-seeking measures—a trend, which I refer to as the 
legalization of truth spaces. Activists thus managed to increase their 
‘invented’ space to foster deliberative spaces of justice for civil society. 
                                                        
39 The following information is based on the statute from 26 March 2011. Supra note 22. 
40 Several case studies discuss the legal problems of amnesties, elaborating on the political 
difficulties of amnesties to foster democratic transition and arguing that that amnesties or 
pardons should only be considered in exceptional cases as to not jeopardize the retributive 
justice efforts and only if other forms of justice mechanisms, such as restorative instruments, 
are in place (Stahn 2005; Gibson 2002). 
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Paradoxically, however, I also demonstrated that despite their goal of legal-
oriented depoliticization of restorative justice processes, transitional justice 
efforts in the region remain nonetheless highly political. The road to a 
sustainable transition in the region is still long and will require human rights 
activists to continue their grass-roots projects and establish a dialogue 
between different victim groups across the former Yugoslavia. Yet, at the 
same time, they also need to invest in their technical expertise in order to 
secure additional external funding to maintain and expand their restorative 
justice efforts. 
 
Arnaud Kurze 
 
14 
 
References 
 
Amnesty International. 2010. Behind a wall of silence: Prosection of war 
crimes in Croatia. Amnesty International Publications. 
Andrić, Gordana, and Eldin Hadžović. 2011. “REKOM Initiative Collects 
Signatures Across Balkans.” BalkanInsight.com, April 26. 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/million-signatures-for-the-
victims-of-balkan-wars. 
Associated Press. 2010. “Serbian president apologizes for wartime 
massacre”, November 4. 
http://www.wtop.com/?sid=2105540&nid=105. 
B92. 2011. NGOs Fall Out Over Donations. Život. June 30. 
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/society-
article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=06&dd=30&nav_id=75197&version=print. 
Bellamy, Alex J. 2003. The formation of Croatian National Identity: A 
Centuries-Old Dream. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Burt, Jo-Marie. 2009. “Guilty as Charged: The Trial of Former Peruvian 
President Alberto Fujimori for Human Rights Violations.” International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 3 (3): 384. 
Coalition for RECOM. 2009. Report about The Consultative Process on 
Instruments of Truth- Seeking About War Crimes and Other Serious 
Violations of Human Rights in Post-Yugoslav Countries. 
http://www.korekom.org/webpage/1. 
———. 2010. Why Coalition for RECOM? 
http://www.zarekom.org/index.php?/webpage/1. 
Collins, Cath. 2006. “Grounding Global Justice: International Networks and 
Domestic Human Rights Accountability in Chile and El Salvador.” 
Journal of Latin American Studies 38: 711-38. 
Croatian Times. 2011. Croatian Government Forms Team to Help Gotovina, 
Markac. Croatiantimes.com. April 18. 
http://www.croatiantimes.com/news/General_News/2011-04-
18/18637/Croatian_government_forms_team_to_help_Gotovina,_Mar
kac. 
Dezalay, Yves, and Bryant G. Garth. 2002. The Internationalization of Palace 
Wars: Lawyers, Economists, and the Contest to Transform Latin 
American States. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. 2000. Crime and punishment. Trans. Keith Carabine. 
Wordsworth Editions. 
Erlanger, Steven. 2011. “Pro-Mladic Demonstrators in Serbia Rally Against 
His Extradition - NYTimes.com.” New York Times, May 29. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/30/world/europe/30serbia.html?_r=1
&pagewanted=print. 
Gibson, J. L. 2002. “Truth, justice, and reconciliation: Judging the fairness of 
amnesty in South Africa.” American Journal of Political Science 46 (3): 
540-556. 
Grodsky, Brian. 2009. “International Prosecutions and Domestic Politics: The 
Use of Truth Commissions as Compromise Justice in Serbia and 
Croatia.” International Studies Review 11 (4): 687-706. 
Jeffrey, Alex. 2011. “The Political Geographies of Transitional Justice.” 
Transactions of The Institute of British Geographers. 
Arnaud Kurze 
 
15 
Jouhanneau, Cécile. 2010. Les Mésaventures des Projets de Commission 
Vérité et Réconciliation pour la Bosnie-Herzégovine (1997-2006): Une 
Étude de la Circulation des Modèles Internationaux de Résolution des 
Conflits Mémoriels. In Le Passé au Présent: Gisements Mémoriels et 
Politiques Publiques en Europe Centrale et Orientale, ed. George 
Mink and Pascal Bonnard. Paris: Michel Houdiard Editeur. 
Kandić, Nataša. 2009. Trials for war crimes and ethnically and politically 
motivated crimes in post-Yugoslav countries. Humanitarian Law 
Center. 
Lazić, Mirjana, Eldar Jahić, and K. Kruhonja, eds. 2009. War Crime Trials 
Monitoring-Regional Trial Monitoring Team Report 2004-2008. Center 
for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights Osijek. 
Marcenaro, Pietro. 2011. Reconciliation and Political Dialogue Between the 
Countries of the Former Yugoslavia. Parliamentary Assembly 
Rapporteur Report. Council of Europe. 
Martin-Ortega, Olga, and Johanna Herman. 2010. Hybrid Tribunals & the 
Rule of Law Notes from Bosnia & Herzegovina & Cambodia. Working 
Paper. Department of Political Science, Lund University, Sweden. 
Miraftab, Faranak, and Shana Wills. 2005. “Insurgency and Spaces of Active 
Citizenship.” Journal of Planning Education and Research 25 (2): 200. 
Pavlaković, Vjeran. 2008. Better the Grave than a Slave: Croatia and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. In Croatia 
since Independence. War Politics, Society and Foreign Relations, ed. 
Sabrina P. Ramet, Konrad Clewing, and Reneo Lukić, 446-477. 
München: Oldenburg Verlag. 
———. 2009. “Better the Grave than a Slave - Croatia and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.” (Unpublished 
manuscript). 
Payne, Leigh A. 2008. Unsettling Accounts: Neither Truth Nor Reconciliation 
in Confessions of State Violence. Duke Univ Pr. 
Pejic, Jelena. 2001. “The Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A 
Shaky Start.” Fordham International Law Journal 25: 1. 
Pejic, Nenad. 2010. “The Weight Of Wreaths And Words.” Radio Free Europe 
/ Radio Liberty (November 4). 
http://www.rferl.org/content/The_Weight_Of_Wreaths_And_Words/22
11082.html. 
Popić, Linda, and Belma Panjeta. 2010. Compensation, Transitional Justice 
and Conditional International Credit in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Sarajevo: Royal Norwegian Embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Embassy of Switzerland in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Popovic, Lidija. 2007. “Tadic Apology to Croats Divides Serbia.” Balkan 
Investigative Reporting Network, June 26. 
http://birn.eu.com/en/89/10/3417/?tpl=30. 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 2011a. Mladic Friend Approved As Serbian 
Health Minister. News. March 17. 
http://www.rferl.org/content/mladic_friend_serbian_health_minister/23
39279.html. 
———. 2011b. Hague Tribunal Sentences Croatian Generals To Long Prison 
Terms. News. April 14. 
http://www.rferl.org/content/un_judgments_due_in_croatian_war_crim
es_case/3557888.html. 
Arnaud Kurze 
 
16 
Ramet, Sabrina. 2010. Politics in Croatia since 1990. In Central and 
Southeast European Politics Since 1989, 258. 
Roht-Arriaza, Naomi. 2005. The Pinochet Effect: Transnational Justice In The 
Age Of Human Rights. University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Stahn, Carsten. 2005. “Complementarity, amnesties and alternative forms of 
justice: some interpretative guidelines for the International Criminal 
Court.” Journal of International Criminal Justice 3 (3): 695. 
Subotić, Jelena. 2009. Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans. 
Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 
Teitel, Ruti G. 2005. “The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional 
Justice.” Cornell International Law Journal 38: 837-862. 
———. 2010. “Global Transitional Justice.” Center for Global Studies 
Working Paper Series on Human Rights, Global Justice & Democracy 
(8). 
Urry, John. 2000. Sociology of Time and Space. In The Blackwell Companion 
to Social Theory, 416–444. Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell 
Publishers. 
Wilson, Richard. 2005. “Judging history: The historical record of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.” Human 
Rights Quarterly 27 (3): 908-942. 
 
